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Abstract
From a perspective of designing or engineering for opinion formation games in social
networks, the opinion maximization (or minimization) problem has been studied
mainly for designing subset selecting algorithms. We furthermore define a two-
player zero-sum Stackelberg game of competitive opinion optimization by letting the
player under study as the first-mover minimize the sum of expressed opinions by
doing so-called “internal opinion design”, knowing that the other adversarial player
as the follower is to maximize the same objective by also conducting her own internal
opinion design.
We propose for the min player to play the follow-the-perturbed-leader algorithm in
such Stackelberg game, obtaining losses depending on the other adversarial player’s
play. Since our strategy of subset selection is combinatorial in nature, the probabil-
ities in a distribution over all the strategies would be too many to be enumerated
one by one. Thus, we design a randomized algorithm to produce a (randomized)
pure strategy. We show that the strategy output by the randomized algorithm for
the min player is essentially an approximate equilibrium strategy against the other
adversarial player.
1 Introduction
The opinion forming process in a social network can be naturally thought as opinion influ-
encing and updating dynamics. This already attracted researchers’ interest a while ago in
mathematical sociology, and recently in theoretical computer science. DeGroot [9] modeled
the opinion formation process by associating each individual with a numeric-value opinion
and letting the opinion be updated by weighted averaging the opinions of her friends and her
own, where the weights represent how much she is influenced by her friends. This update
dynamics will converge to a consensus where all individuals hold the same opinions. How-
ever, we can easily observe that in the real world, the consensus is difficult to be reached.
Friedkin and Johnsen [11] differentiated an expressed opinion that each individual in the
networks updates over time from an internal opinion that each individual is born with and
stays unchanged. Thus, an individual would always be influenced by her inherent belief,
and the dynamics converges to an unique equilibrium, which may not be a consensus.
Bindel et al. [5] viewed the updating rule mentioned above equivalently as each player
updating her expressed opinion to minimize her quadratic individual cost function, which
consists of the disagreement between her expressed opinion and those of her friends, and the
difference between her expressed and internal opinions. They analyzed how socially good
or bad the system can be at equilibrium compared to the optimum solution in terms of the
price of anarchy [16]. The price of anarchy is at most 9/8 tight in undirected graphs and is
unbounded in directed graphs. Nevertheless, a bounded price of anarchy can be obtained
for weighted Eulerian graphs in [5], where the total incoming weights equal to the total
outgoing weights at each node, while the price of anarchy is bounded for opinion formation
games with directed graphs more general than weighted Eulerian graphs in [6].
From a perspective of designing or engineering, opinion maximization (or minimization)
has been studied for seeding algorithms in [12, 2]. We then define the game of Stackelberg
opinion optimization that will be introduced and analyzed in this paper. With a linear
objective of the sum of expressed opinions, opinion maximization seeks to find a k-subset
(for a fixed size k) of nodes to have their expressed opinions fixed to 1 to maximize the
objective. Opinion minimization can be similarly defined to minimize the objective. A
seeding algorithm chooses what subset of nodes to fix their expressed opinions (to 1 if to
maximize the objective), and it turns out that opinion optimization is NP-hard [12] so
greedy algorithms [12, 2] have been designed to approximate the optimum with the help of
the submodularity of such social cost.
It is obvious to see that controlling the expressed opinions is not the only way to optimize
the objective. It is natural to consider changing the intrinsic (or equivalently, internal)
opinions of some subset to optimize the objective. Notice that setting a chosen subset
of nodes to have certain assigned intrinsic opinions does not prohibit later deciding their
expressed opinions by the influence and update dynamics while controlling the expressed
opinions of the chosen subset is definitive. In this sense, such “internal opinion designing”
approach is relatively more relaxed, compared with the previously studied expression control
[12]. Note that intrinsic opinion design enjoys its computational tractability.
One can think of a scenario of two players, one with the goal to minimize (or maximize)
the objective and the other adversarial player trying to do the opposite thing. In such
scenario of competitive opinion optimization, a zero-sum game is formed by these two players
with all the subsets of nodes as the strategy set and each optimizing the same objective in
the opposite direction. We can furthermore define a Stackelberg game by letting the player
under study as the first-mover minimize the sum of expressed opinions by doing internal
opinion design discussed above, knowing that the other adversarial player as the follower
is to maximize the same objective by also her own internal opinion design. Even if a node
is selected by the first-mover for intrinsic opinion design, its internal opinion would still be
overwritten once later selected by the adversarial follower. Thus, a node’s expressed opinion
will be decided by its designed internal opinion (possibly first by the min player and then
the max player) and the update dynamic.
We view our problem of coming up with the min player’s strategy against the max
player’s as an online optimization problem, specifically an online linear optimization one.
We propose for the min player to repeatedly play some “no-regret” learning algorithm in
such two-player Stackelberg game of competitive opinion optimization, obtaining rewards or
losses depending on the other adversarial player’s play. Using generic or specific no-regret
algorithms as strategies is a common approach to reach certain equilibria (on average) in
repeated games [17, Chapter 4][8]. However, the previous results are established when
players only have finite strategies to play. Since our strategies are combinatorial in nature,
i.e., any subset of size k, the probabilities in the distribution over all the strategies (all
k-subsets) would be too many to be enumerated one by one in a vector, which is how
they are treated in the previous works. Therefore, the general result of playing no-regret
algorithms in two-player zero-sum matrix game such as in [8] is not directly applicable here.
Also, due to the problem structure such as how the strategies of the two players are related
to each other and something corresponding to the payoff matrix (which will be clear in
Section 2.1), we do not have symmetry between the two players as those in the previous
results. This justifies why we design algorithms for computing strategies for the min player
facing the other adversarial play (which can be efficiently computed), and settle for, instead
of characterizing equilibrium (which needs equilibrium strategies for both players), showing
that it is indeed the best thing to do for the min player.
The probability distribution for a mixed strategy needs to be expressed implicitly instead
of being expressed explicitly as a long vector. We resort to randomizing over such probability
distributions (at different time steps), and follow this “average” distribution to produce a
k-subset for the min player. Thus, we design a randomized algorithm for outputting a
pure strategy of some uniformly chosen time step. Technically, such strategy computation
has to be modeled as an online linear optimization problem, and the adversary’s strategy
has to be shown efficiently computable. Finally, we show that the strategy output by the
randomized algorithm for the min player converges to an approximate min strategy against
the other adversarial player (the max player) mainly using the no-regret property. In other
words, in our particular setting (opinion optimization games) with large strategy sets, using
the randomized algorithm to play such Stackelberg game with the max plater playing in
adversary guarantees an approximate minmax equilibrium.
1.1 Related Work
Using the sum of expressed opinions as the objective, opinion maximization seeks to find
a k-subset of nodes to have their expressed opinions fixed to 1 to maximize the objective.
Greedy algorithms have been designed to approximate the optimum with the help of the
submodularity of such social cost [12, 2].
There are works on competitive versions of various (combinatorial) optimization problem
other than competitive opinion optimization that we define in this paper. The most well-
known one is probably competitive influence maximization and its variation [3, 13, 14].
It has been studied for two players playing no-regret algorithms to reach mixed Nash
equilibrium (minmax equilibrium) in general zero-sum matrix-form games where the strat-
egy set is finite [8]. On the other hand, here we apply some specific no-regret algorithms
in Stackelberg opinion optimization games and randomize the output strategy for a large
strategy set to guarantee the convergence to equilibria on expectation.
Another work closely related to that of Bindel et al. for opinion formation games is by
Bhawalkar et al. [4]. The individual cost functions are assumed to be “locally-smooth” in
the sense of [18] and may be more general than quadratic functions, for example, convex
ones. The price of anarchy for undirected graphs with convex cost functions is shown to
be at most 2. They also allowed social networks to change by letting players choose the
k-nearest neighbors throughout opinion updates and bounded the price of anarchy.
When graphs are directed, a bounded price of anarchy is only known for weighted Eu-
lerian graphs [5], which may not be the most general class of directed graphs that give a
bounded price of anarchy. Thus, we bounded the price of anarchy for games with directed
graphs more general than weighted Eulerian graphs in [6]. We gave bounds on the the price
of anarchy for a more general class of directed graphs with conditions intuitively meaning
that each node does not influence the others more than she is influenced by herself and the
others, where the bounds depend on such influence differences (in a ratio). This generalizes
the previous results on directed graphs, and recovers and matches the previous bounds in
some specific classes of (directed) Eulerian graphs. We also showed that there exists an
example that just slightly violates the conditions with an unbounded price of anarchy so
the conditions are indeed necessary for a bounded price of anarchy. Chierichetti et al. [7]
considered the games with discrete preferences, where expressed and internal opinions are
chosen from a discrete set and distances measuring “similarity” between opinions correspond
to costs.
2 Preliminaries
We introduce fundamentals in opinion formation games first and proceed with preliminaries
about our Stackelberg games of competitive opinion optimization in Section 2.1.
We describe a social network as a weighted graph (G,w) for directed graph G = (V,E)
and weight matrix w = [wij ]ij . The node set V of size n is the selfish players, and the
edge set E is the relationships between any pair of nodes. The edge weight wij ≥ 0 is a
real number and represents how much player i is influenced by player j; note that weight
wii can be seen as a self-loop weight, i.e., how much player i influences (or is influenced
by) herself. Each (node) player has an internal opinion si, which is unchanged and not
affected by opinion updates. An opinion formation game can be expressed as an instance
(G,w, s) that combines weighted graph (G,w) and vector s = (si)i. Each player’s strategy
is an expressed opinion zi ∈ [−1, 1], which may be different from her si ∈ [−1, 1] and gets
updated. Both si and zi are real numbers. The individual cost function of player i is
Ci(z) = wii(zi − si)2 +
∑
j∈N(i)
wij(zi − zj)2 (1)
= wii(zi − si)2 +
∑
j
wij(zi − zj)2, (2)
where z is the strategy profile/vector and N(i) is the set of the neighbors of i, i.e., {j : j 6=
i, wij > 0}. Each node minimizes her cost Ci by choosing her expressed opinion zi. We
analyze the game when it stabilizes, i.e., at equilibrium.
In a (pure) Nash equilibrium z, each player i’s strategy is zi such that given z−i (i.e.,
the opinion vector of all players except i) for any other z′i,
Ci(zi, z−i) ≤ Ci(z′i, z−i). (3)
That is equivalently for each player to update her expressed opinion by the following rule
[5, 4]:
zi =
wiisi +
∑
j 6=i wijzj
wii +
∑
j 6=i wij
. (4)
This is obtained by taking the derivative of Ci w.r.t. zi, setting it to 0 for each i, and
solving the equality system since very player i minimizes Ci. Note that Ci is continuously
differentiable. We consider an objective C(z) =
∑
i zi that is linear in zi’s in this paper.
Absorbing Random Walks
In an opinion formation game, computing Nash equilibrium can be done by using absorbing
random walks [10]. In a random walk on a directed graph H = (Z,R) with its weight matrix
W , a node in Z is an absorbing node if the random walk can only enters this node but not
exit from it, and each entry Wi,j is the weight on edge (i, j) in R. Let B ⊆ Z be the set
of all absorbing nodes, and the set of the remaining nodes U = Z \ B is transient nodes.
Given the transition matrix P (from the weight matrix W ) whose entry Pi,j represents the
probability transiting from node i to node j in this random walk, a |U | × |B| matrix QUB
can be computed where each entry QUBi,j is the probability that a random walk starting at
transient state i ∈ U is absorbed at state j ∈ B (see Appendix A for details). If a random
walk starting from transient node i gets absorbed at an absorbing node j, we assign to node
i the value bj that is associated with absorbing node j. With QUB, the expected value of i
is then fi =
∑
j∈B QUBi,jbj . Let fU be the vector of the expected values for all i ∈ U and
fB the vector of values bj for all j ∈ B. We have that
fU = QUBfB. (5)
Thus, computing the expressed opinion vector at Nash equilibrium for an opinion for-
mation game can be done by taking advantage of Equation (5) on a graph H = (Z,R)
constructed for our purpose as follows. The weighted graph (G,w) with original internal
opinions s gives U = V and B = V ′ for the random walk on H , where each ui ∈ V has a
distinct copy u′i ∈ V ′ and R = E ∪ {(ui, u′i) : ui ∈ V, u′i ∈ V ′} with each weight wuiu′i = 1
and fB = s so z = QUBs.
In the case of expressed opinion control for opinion maximization as in [12, Section 3.3],
controlling the set S ⊆ V gives U = V \ S and B = V ′ ∪ S with all bj = 1 for j ∈ S,
i.e., fB = (s,1), where 1 is a all-1 vector of size |S|, since the nodes in S cannot change
their expressed opinions but stick to value 1. The so-called internal opinion design will be
explained in the following Section. There, when using absorbing random walks for arriving
at stable states, U = V and B = V ′ along with the weighted edges remain as mentioned in
the last paragraph yet with fB being the internal opinion after manipulation.
2.1 Stackelberg Opinion Optimization Games and Online Linear
Optimization
A two-player Stackelberg opinion optimization game can be described as an instance
((G,w), s, X, Y, f). We will elaborate each component one by one. Let the min player’s
strategy be a vector x = (xi)i ∈ Rn with xi ∈ {0,−si − 1} and ||x||0 = k. Denote the
modified internal opinion vector by s′ = s + x with −1 ≤ si + xi ≤ 1 for all i after the
min player makes her decision first. So, for a node i, if it is selected by the min player,
its internal opinion becomes −1 or stays as si if not selected by the min player. Knowing
s′, the adversarial player’s strategy is a vector y = (yi)i ∈ Rn with yi ∈ {0,−s′i + 1} and
||y||0 = k. Denote the final internal opinion vector by s′ + y with −1 ≤ s′i + yi ≤ 1 for all
i after the adversarial player also makes her decision. If a node i is selected by the adver-
sarial player, its final internal opinion immediately becomes 1 or stays as s′i if not selected
by the adversarial player. Let X = {x ∈ Rn : ||x||0 = k, xi 6= 0 ⇒ xi = −si − 1} and
Y = {y ∈ Rn : ||y||0 = k, yi 6= 0 ⇒ yi = −s′i + 1} denote the strategy sets X and Y . Note
that the expressed opinions are still influenced by s′ + y and get updated to the value at
stable state by the dynamic, using absorbing random walks (applying Equation (5)).
The min player minimizes her cost function over all x’s, which the adversarial player
maximizes,
g(x,y) = C(QUB(s
′ + y)) = ℓT(s′ + y) (6)
for U = V and B = V ′ and a vector ℓ = (
∑
iQUBi,j)j .
2.1.1 No-Regret Algorithms for Online Linear Optimization
In the setting of online convex optimization, we describe an online game between a player
and the environment. The player is given a convex set K ⊂ Rd and has to make a sequence
of decisions x(1),x(2), ... ∈ K. After deciding x(t), the environment reveals a convex reward
function f (t) and the player obtains f (t)(x(t)). The performance of the player is measured
by regret defined in the following. In this paper, what is closely related to our problem is
a more specific problem of online linear optimization where the reward functions are linear,
i.e., f (t)(x) = 〈f (t),x〉 for some f (t) ∈ Rd.
We define the player’s adaptive strategy L as a function taking as input a subsequence
of loss vectors f (1), ..., f (t−1) and returns a point xt ← L(f (1), ..., f (t−1)) where x(t) ∈ K.
Definition 1 Given an online linear optimization algorithm L and a sequence of loss vectors
f (1), f (2), ... ∈ Rd, let the regret Regret(L; f1:T ) be defined as
T∑
t=1
〈f (t),x(t)〉 −min
x∈K
T∑
t=1
〈f (t),x〉.3
3For a player maximizing her total reward given a sequence of reward vectors, the regret can also be
defined accordingly.
A desirable property that one would want an online linear optimization algorithm to
have is a regret which scales sublinearly in T . For example, the online gradient descent
algorithm [19] guarantees a regret of O(
√
T ). This property can be formally captured as
the following.
Theorem 1 (e.g., Theorem 10 of [1]) For any bounded decision set K ⊆ Rd there exists
an algorithm LK such that Regret(LK) = o(T ) for any sequence of loss vectors {f (t)} with
bounded norm.
The no-regret property is useful in a variety of contexts. For example, it is known (e.g.,
[1, Section 3]) that two players playing o(T )-regret algorithms LX and LY , respectively, in
a zero-sum game with a cost function c : X ×Y → R of the form c(x,y) = xTMy for some
M ∈ Rn×m give a version of minmax equilibrium.
Theorem 2 (Corollary 3 of [1]) For compact convex sets X ⊂ Rn and Y ⊂ Rm and any
biaffine function4 c : X × Y → R, we have
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
c(x,y) = max
y∈Y
min
x∈X
c(x,y). (7)
We restate the argument here to provide a reference to the standard technique and result that
have been existing for playing no-regret algorithms in a zero-sum n×m matrix game. One
can view the argument in the following as something we would like to do in Section 3 yet with
different technical details for coping with our more challenging games with combinatorial
strategies. For every t, we have x(t) ← LX (f (1), ..., f (t−1)) and y(t) ← LY(h(1), ..., h(t−1))
for f (t) =Myt and h
(t) = −xtM . By applying the definition of regret twice, we have
1
T
T∑
t=1
x(t)
T
My(t) = min
x∈X
xTM(
1
T
T∑
t=1
y(t)) +
Regret(LX )
T
≤ max
y∈Y
min
x∈X
xTMy +
o(T )
T
, (8)
1
T
T∑
t=1
x(t)
T
My(t) = max
y∈Y
(
1
T
T∑
t=1
x(t))My − Regret(LY)
T
≥ min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
xTMy − o(T )
T
. (9)
We obtain minx∈X maxy∈Y xTMy ≤ maxy∈Y minx∈X xTMy + o(T )T by combining the in-
equalities above and setting T →∞, and minx∈X maxy∈Y xTMy ≥ maxy∈Y minx∈X xTMy
by weak duality.
3 Randomized Algorithms for Combinatorial Strategies
For our opinion optimization game, one can first notice that the strategies of the two players
interact with each other and matrix QUB, which corresponds to the cost matrix M , in
a very different way from the standard result discussed in Section 2.1.1. For example,
we have QUB(s + x + y) here instead of x
TMy. Because of the differences, we design
algorithms for computing an approximate equilibrium strategy of the min player (against
the adversarial player), and focus on efficient computation of the adversary’s strategy and the
equilibrium strategy analysis only for the min player, instead of characterizing equilibrium,
4A biaffine function c : X × Y → R satisfies c(αx + (1 − α)x′,y) = αc(x,y) + (1 − α)c(x′,y) and
c(x, αy + (1− α)y′) = αc(x,y) + (1 − α)c(x,y′) for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1, x,x′ ∈ X and y,y′ ∈ Y .
i.e., equilibrium strategies for both players (since the adversarial player can overwrite the
min player’s selection and we do not have a symmetric structure such as xTMy in our
problem).
Given the strategy sets X and Y defined in Section 2.1, our Stackelberg opinion opti-
mization game takes a cost function g : X × Y → R defined in Section 2.1. Such game is
played repeatedly, where at time t the min player chooses x(t) and the adversarial (max)
player chooses y(t). Here, the min player chooses her strategies according to a no-regret
algorithm, and the adversarial player is assumed to maximize the value of the objective.
3.1 Follow-the-Perturbed-Leader Algorithms
If we want to use the follow-the-perturbed-leader algorithm [15] to compute a sequence of
“mixed” strategies in our game, then since our strategies are combinatorial in nature, i.e.,
|X | = |Y| = Cnk , the probabilities in a distribution over all the strategies would be too many
to be enumerated one by one. The probability distribution needs to be expressed implicitly
instead of being expressed explicitly as a long vector. Let Xt denote this long vector of the
probability distribution at time step t.
For every time step t, we have that x(t) ← LX (f (1)(·), ...
, f (t−1)(·)) where now LX is the follow-the-perturbed-leader algorithm, and estimating
y(t) ≃ argmax
y∈Y
g(E[x(t)],y)
will be explained in Section 3.2. 5 As in online linear optimization, we need to define the
loss function for the min player’s strategy first. Let
N (τ) = {i : y(τ)i 6= 0}
be the k-subset that the adversarial player selects at time step τ . Fixing the adversarial
player’s strategy y(τ) and thereby determining N (τ), we can write the loss function as an
affine function of the min player’s strategy x for τ from 1 to t− 1:
f (τ)(x) = g(x,y(τ)) =
∑
i∈{1,...,n}\N(τ)
ℓi(xi + si) +
∑
i∈N(τ)
ℓi. (10)
We are now ready to specify the follow-the-perturbed-leader algorithm for “large strategy
sets” to get a randomized pure strategy x(t) at each time step t. The min player’s strategy
at time step t is
x(t)
= argmin
x∈X
L(t)(x)
= arg min
x∈X
(
t−1∑
τ=1
f (τ)(x) +Rtx)
= arg min
x∈X
(
t−1∑
τ=1
∑
i∈{1,...,n}\N(τ)
ℓi(xi + si) +
∑
i∈N(τ)
ℓi +Rtx),
for a random vector Rt ∈ [0,
√
T ]n uniformly distributed in each dimension. L(t)(x) can be
simplified to
∑n
i=1 αixi + c with each
xi ∈ ∩τ :i∈{1,...,n}\N(τ)[−1− si, 1− si],
5We use the notation E[x] to denote an expected vector throughout this paper.
where αi = ℓi|{τ : i ∈ {1, ..., n}\N (τ)}|+
∑
tRt(i) ≥ 0 for each i with realized random value
Rt(i) at t and c is a constant. Thus, x
(t) can be efficiently computed by considering αi and
xi’s range for all i and selecting the top k nodes that contribute to L
(t) least. Note that x(t)
does not represent a mixed strategy in our game, but a randomized (combinatorial) pure
strategy following distribution Xt. Actually, Ex(t)∼X(t) [x(t)] can be estimated by sampling
x(t) enough times. We explain this in Section 3.2.
Thus, we conclude that our randomized algorithm outputs a (randomized) pure strategy
in a uniformly random time step Tmin for the min player against the adversarial player who
ideally is to play argmaxy∈Y g(Ex(t)∼X(t) [x(t)],y) at each time step t. We can estimate this
strategy of the adversary as accurately as possible with high probability. That is, with high
probability
g(Ex(t)∼X(t) [x
(t)],y(t)) ≥ argmax
y∈Y
g(Ex(t)∼X(t) [x
(t)],y) − ǫ,
where ǫ > 0 is an error from estimation, which can be made as small as desired. We show that
such strategy y(t) of the adversary can be found efficiently in Section 3.2. The randomized
algorithm runs the follow-the-perturbed-leader update up to time step Tmin. Our main
result is to show that the randomized pure strategy indeed approaches an approximate
minmax equilibrium (see Section 3.3). The randomized algorithm is summarized in the
following.
Algorithm 1 Randomized algorithm for combinatorial strategies
1: Choose Tmin uniformly at random from {1, ..., T }
2: for t = 1 to Tmin do
3: x(t) = argminx∈X(
∑t−1
τ=1
∑
i∈{1,...,n}\N(τ) ℓi(xi + si) +
∑
i∈N(τ) ℓi + Rtx) for a uni-
formly random (in each dimension) vector Rt ∽ U [0,
√
T ]n, where the adversary’s
y(τ) that determines N (τ) can be efficiently computed using the procedure described
in Section 3.2.
4: end for
3.2 Computing the Adversary’s Strategy
We now show that the adversarial player’s strategy y(t) satisfies with high probability
g(Ex(t)∼X(t) [x
(t)],y(t)) ≥ argmax
y∈Y
g(Ex(t)∼X(t) [x
(t)],y) − ǫ,
where ǫ > 0 is an error from estimation, can be efficiently computed (and thereby finding
the loss function f (t)) by estimating each probability that the min player selects node i.
Recall that the cost value can be computed as
g(Ex(t)∼X(t) [x
(t)],y) = C(QUB(Ex(t)∼X(t) [s
(t)′] + y))
= ℓT(Ex(t)∼X(t) [s
(t)′] + y),
where Ex(t)∼X(t) [s(t)
′
] = s + Ex(t)∼X(t) [x(t)] is the expected modified internal opinion by
the min player. The randomized pure strategy produced by the follow-the-perturbed-leader
algorithm at that time step provides a randomized way to modify entries of the vector s to
the value −1.
Let p
(t)
i denote the probability that it chooses to modify node i at time step t. Note that
Ex(t)∼X(t) [x(t)] = (p
(t)
i )i. For each t, we can draw r samples (each of which is a k-subset of
nodes) from distribution X(t). We let pˆ
(t)
i denote the ratio of the number that it chooses to
modify node i to the number r. By applying the Hoeffding’s inequality, we have
Pr[|pˆ(t)i − p(t)i | > ǫ] ≤ 2 exp(−2ǫ2r).
That is, by choosing r = T , we can use the estimated probability pˆ
(t)
i that is within an
estimation error ǫ =
√
lnT/T from the actual one with at least probability of 1− 2/T 2.
Then the expected cost of the min player (before the adversarial player’s intervention)
is ∑
i
ℓi(pˆ
(t)
i (−1) + (1 − pˆ(t)i )si).
Now the adversarial player would like to increase the min player’s cost as much as possible.
For the max player, by compromising node i, the expected cost can be increased by
∆i = ℓi · 1− ℓi(pˆ(t)i (−1) + (1− pˆ(t)i )si).
Thus, the adversarial (max) player simply chooses the k nodes with the k largest ∆i’s. Note
that using pˆ
(t)
i for each node i incurs an estimation error that jointly guarantees computing
the adversary’s y(t) efficiently such that with at least probability of 1− 2/T 2
g(Ex(t)∼X(t) [x
(t)],y(t))
≥ argmax
y∈Y
g(Ex(t)∼X(t) [x
(t)],y) −O(
√
lnT
T
). (11)
3.3 Equilibrium Strategy Analysis
Let the min player play the strategy output by the randomized algorithm and the adversarial
player’s strategy be the one maximizing the loss, given the min player’s chosen strategy.
First, it can be shown that the play output by the randomized algorithm is O(
√
T )-regret.
This is achieved naturally in the sense of expected losses of the min player since there is a
random vector Rt as a random source that produces the distribution X
(t).
Lemma 3 For the min player, follow-the-perturbed-leader algorithms are O(
√
T )-regret
w.r.t. her respective loss functions depending on the adversary’s strategy y(t)’s, i.e.,
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ex(t)∼X(t) [f
(t)(x(t))]
=
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ex(t)∼X(t) [g(x
(t),y(t))]
≤ 1
T
min
x∈X
T∑
t=1
f (t)(x) +O(
1√
T
)
=
1
T
min
x∈X
T∑
t=1
g(x,y(t)) +O(
1√
T
).
Proof 4 We apply Theorem 1.1(a) of [15] in our context with random vector Rt ∈ [0,
√
T ]n
chosen uniformly at random in each dimension.
Since the randomized algorithm chooses time step Tmin uniformly at random from
1, ..., T , we let
ETmin∈{1,...,T},x(Tmin)∼X(Tmin) [x
(Tmin)] =
∑T
t=1Ex(t)∼X(t) [x
(t)]
T
.
Then, we are ready to state the main result.
Theorem 5 The strategy x(Tmin) output by the randomized algorithm for the min player
(against the adversarial player), which has the O( 1√
T
)-average regret property, is a O( 1√
T
)-
approximate equilibrium strategy with high probability.
Proof 6 For the min player, we have that
max
y∈Y
g(ETmin∈{1,...,T},x(Tmin)∼X(Tmin) [x
(Tmin)],y)
= max
y∈Y
1
T
T∑
t=1
g(Ex(t)∼X(t) [x
(t)],y)
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
max
y∈Y
g(Ex(t)∼X(t) [x
(t)],y)
by the linearity of expectation and
max
y∈Y
g(Ex(t)∼Xt [x
(t)],y) ≥ g(Ex(t)∼Xt [x(t)],y′)
for any y′.
For each t, applying Inequality (11) that accounts for estimation, we obtain with at least
probability of 1− 2/T (by a union bound)
1
T
T∑
t=1
max
y∈Y
g(Ex(t)∼X(t) [x
(t)],y)
≤ 1
T
T∑
t=1
g(Ex(t)∼X(t) [x
(t)],y(t)) +O(
ln T
T
).
Due to the fact that f is affine in x(t), the right-hand side of the inequality is equivalent to
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ex(t)∼X(t) [g(x
(t),y(t))] +O(
ln T
T
).
By the O( 1√
T
)-average regret property from Lemma 3, we finally have
1
T
T∑
t=1
Ex(t)∼X(t) [g(x
(t),y(t))] +O(
ln T
T
)
≤ 1
T
min
x∈X
T∑
t=1
g(x,y(t)) +O(
1√
T
)
≤ min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
g(x,y) +O(
1√
T
).
4 Discussions and Future Work
One does not necessarily have to use linear objectives. For example, the objective of sum
of the node players’ costs is not a linear one. Although we focus on computing the min
player’s equilibrium strategy due to our model structure in this paper. It does not preclude
the possibility of exploring other suitable models for competitive opinion optimization that
might allow computing or learning equilibrium-inducing strategies for all players.
As future directions, we can generalize competitive opinion optimization to multi-player
non-zero-sum games with different (linear) objectives in terms of expressed opinions for
different players each optimizing her own objective. Playing certain no-regret algorithms, the
average strategy of each player then might converge to certain more permissive equilibrium
(Nash equilibrium, correlated equilibrium, etc.). It does not really make sense in a zero-sum
game to ask about the price of anarchy. Nevertheless, the price-of-anarchy type of questions
becomes interesting and meaningful in a non-zero-sum game setting again.
A Computing Matrix QUB
We restate the computation from Section 3.3 of [12]. The transition matrix P is constructed
by normalizing each row vector of the weight matrix W . Given the set of absorbing nodes
B and the set of transient nodes U , then P can be partitioned into submatrices PUB , PUU ,
identity matrix I, and all-zero matrix 0, where PUB is the |U | × |B| submatrix with the
transition probabilities from transient nodes to absorbing nodes and PUU is the |U | × |U |
submatrix with the transition probabilities between transient nodes.
The probability of transition from i to j in exactly l steps is denoted as the (i, j) entry
of the matrix P lUU . We can construct the |U | × |U | fundamental matrix F of the absorbing
random walk where the (i, j) entry is the probability that such random walk starting from
i ends up at j without being absorbed.
F =
∞∑
t=0
(PUU )
l = (I − PUU )−1.
Finally, we have that
QUB = FPUB,
where each entry QUBi,j of such |U | × |B| matrix is the probability that a random walk
starting at transient node i gets absorbed at absorbing node j.
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